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MISSION IMPOSSIBLE: ON BAKER, EQUAL BENEFITS,
AND THE IMPOSITION OF STIGMA
Mark Strasser*
In Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the state constitution
required same-sex couples be afforded the same benefits and protections that
married couples receive. While the state did not need to recognize same-sex
marriage, at the very least, it needed to create a parallel system providing equal
benefits. Professor Mark Strasser argues that a civil union alternative ultimately
would not meet the court's requirements because it cannot possibly provide this
requisite equality. His central concern is the differing treatment that same-sex
marriage and domestic partnerships receive from other states. Additionally,
Professor Strasser notes that such a system would fail to meet the requirement of
equality due to the stigma attaching to civil union status. He concludes that such
a parallel system would have all the legitimacy of "separate but equal."
INTRODUCTION
In Baker v. State,' the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Common Benefits
Clause of the Vermont Constitution requires same-sex couples to be afforded the
opportunity to receive the same benefits and protections that married couples
receive. The court suggested that it was not necessary for the state to recognize
same-sex marriages if those benefits and protections could be accorded some other
way, although the court cautioned that the benefits would, in fact, have to be equal
if the parallel system was to pass constitutional muster.2
* Professor of Law, Capital University Law School.
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
2 Seeid. at 886.
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There is good reason to believe that the civil union status created by the
Vermont legislature does not meet the state constitution's requirements. A civil
union altemative for same-sex couples, while better than what any other state has
offered thus far, nonetheless cannot offer equal benefits, protections, and security,
precisely because civil unions are less likely than marriages to be recognized in
other jurisdictions. If that is so, however, and if there are particular benefits and
protections that different-sex married couples would be able to enjoy in other
jurisdictions that same-sex civil union partners would not, then the Vermont
legislature has failed to meet the state constitutional mandate by failing to permit
same-sex couples to marry.
That same-sex marriages would likely offer greater benefits and protections in
some of the other states is not dependent on whether the constitutionality of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)3 will be upheld, since DOMA does not preclude
states from according recognition to same-sex marriages but merely gives them the
choice of whether to do so. Yet, it should not be assumed that DOMA will pass
constitutional muster when it is finally challenged, and its constitutional
vulnerability itself has implications.
Suppose that DOMA is struck down as an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional power or even that only the DOMA section reserving federal benefits
for different-sex couples is struck down. Civil union partners would presumably
be treated like domestic partners who, whether or not they are of the same sex,4 are
not entitled to the federal benefits that married partners receive.5 If that is so, then
the civil union system set up by Vermont would not entitle Vermont same-sex
couples to the federal benefits to which they would have been entitled had they been
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C).
4 See Todd Foreman, Comment, Nondiscrimination Ordinance 101 San Francisco's
Nondiscrimination in City Contracts and Benefits Ordinance: A New Approach to Winning
Domestic Partnership Benefits, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 319, 323-24 (1999)
("Some jurisdictions also allow heterosexual couples to register as domestic partners."). Of
course, some jurisdictions do not. See, e.g., Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91,
93 (Ill. App. I Dist. 1999) ("[T]he Chicago City Council adopted the DPO [domestic
partnership ordinance] ... which makes available employee benefits to unmarried, same-sex
partners of City employees."); Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435,439 (Or. App.
1998) (discussing judgment that "defines 'domestic partners' as homosexual persons not
related by blood closer than first cousins who are not legally married, who have continuously
lived together in an exclusive and loving relationship that they intend to maintain for the rest
of their lives, who have joint financial accounts and joint financial responsibilities, who
would be married to each other if Oregon law permitted it, who have no other domestic
partners, and who are 18 years of age or older").
' See Foreman, supra note 4, at 342 (noting that the federal government denies marital
benefits to domestic partners).
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allowed to marry.' Thus, the invalidation of the federal benefits provision of
DOMA would even more clearly establish that the civil union system in Vermont
does not meet the state's constitutional requirements.
Even if one sets aside the fact that same-sex civil union partners will not receive
the benefits that they might have received had they been married, the stigmatization
that occurs by setting up a separate civil union system for same-sex couples alone
suffices to establish that the separate system does not pass constitutional muster.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a parallel system according identical benefits that
would not have overtones of stigma. Thus, if the Vermont Constitution requires
that all Vermonters receive equal benefits, it is difficult to imagine how that could
be interpreted to require anything less than the state's recognition of same-sex
marriages.
Part I of this Article discusses why the strong tendency and possible
constitutional obligation of states to recognize a marriage that is currently valid in
another domiciliary state suggests that the Vermont legislature has not set up a
parallel status for same-sex couples that in fact accords them equal benefits. Part
I also explains why the likely invalidation of the DOMA section reserving federal
benefits for different-sex couples makes it even clearer that Vermont's
establishment of a civil union system offends state constitutional guarantees.
Part II discusses the stigmatization that necessarily results from the
establishment of a separate status system for same-sex couples. This imposition of
stigma alone suffices to establish the unconstitutionality of a "separate but equal"
system for same-sex couples. This Article concludes that the Vermont legislature
has not met the state constitution's requirements by setting up a civil union system
both because that system does not accord equal benefits, and because, even if it had,
the stigmatization that will inevitably occur cannot help but offend constitutional
guarantees.
I. BENEFITS AND PROTECTIONS
In Baker v. State,' the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Common Benefits
Clause of the Vermont Constitution requires that all Vermonters be~afforded "the
common benefit, protection, and security of the law."8 The court explicitly refused
to address whether "notwithstanding equal benefits and protections under Vermont
law-the denial of a marriage license operates per se to deny constitutionally-
6 But see David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the
Legal Needs ofLesbian andGay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447,488 (1996) ("[S]ome
states might extend all state laws bearing on marriage to same-sex couples while the federal
government withheld the incidents of federal law."). Yet, the question then would be
whether Congress' doing that would itself offend constitutional guarantees.
7 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
1 Id at 867.
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protected rights," 9 deferring that issue for another day) ° The court did make clear
that if the Vermont legislature fails to pass the appropriate legislation in a timely
manner,"' the appellants can then petition the court to require that marriage licenses
be issued. 2 The court thus recognized that, in the future, it might be asked to
decide cases involving two different kinds of allegations. (1) the state had failed
to fulfill its obligations to accord Vermonters equal benefits, and (2) while the state
had accorded equal benefits to all similarly situated Vermonters,' 3 nonetheless, it
had effected an invidious classification that could not withstand constitutional
scrutiny. 4
A. Which Benefits Must Be Included?
The Vermont Supreme Court listed a whole host of benefits and protections
incident to marriage in Vermont, including:
[T]he right to receive a portion of the estate of a spouse who dies
intestate and protection against disinheritance through elective share
provisions; preference in being appointed as the personal representative
of a spouse who dies intestate; the right to bring a lawsuit for the
wrongful death of a spouse; the right to bring an action for loss of
consortium; the right to workers' compensation survivor benefits; the
right to spousal benefits statutorily guaranteed to public employees,
including health, life, disability, and accident insurance; the opportunity
to be covered as a spouse under group life insurance policies issued to
an employee; the opportunity to be covered as the insured's spouse
under an individual health insurance policy; the right to claim an
evidentiary privilege for marital communications; homestead rights and
protections; the presumption of joint ownership of property and the
concomitant right of survivorship; hospital visitation and other rights
incident to the medical treatment of a family member; and the right to
9 Id. at 886.
See id. (holding that "some future case may attempt to establish that [claim]").
See id. at 887 ("[Wle hold that the current statutory scheme shall remain in effect for
a reasonable period of time to enable the Legislature to consider and enact implementing
legislation in an orderly and expeditious fashion.").
12 See id. ("In the event that the benefits and protections in question are not statutorily
granted, plaintiffs may petition this Court to order the remedy they originally sought.").
3 The issue for the court was whether "the marital exclusion treats persons who are
similarly situated for purposes of the law, differently." Id. at 882.
"' For an analysis of this second prong, see infra notes 76-113 and accompanying text.
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receive, and the obligation to provide, spousal support, maintenance, and
property division in the event of separation or divorce."
Further, the court made clear that it had only offered a partial list.'" Indeed, civil
union partners are entitled to a comprehensive list of benefits." A separate
question, which will not be addressed here, is whether the package includes all the
enumerated benefits within the state to which other couples are entitled.'
When Congress passed DOMA, it thereby illustrated and emphasized that some
of the benefits usually accorded to married couples are conferred by other states or
by the federal government. At least one issue that the Supreme Court of Vermont
will have to address is whether the Vermont legislature has met the requirement to
afford all Vermonters "the common benefit, protection, and security of the law"'9
when, by recognizing civil unions instead of same-sex marriages, it offered
Vermont same-sex couples fewer benefits and protections vis-a-vis other states, and
perhaps the federal government, than it might have given.
B. Interstate Recognition
When it seemed that Hawaii might recognize same-sex marriages, some
commentators suggested that other states would be required to recognize those
same-sex marriages validly established in Hawaii." Anticipating that Hawaii might
. Baker, 744 A.2d at 883-84 (citations omitted).
6 See id. at 884 (stating that "other statutes could be added to this list").
" The law entitles same-sex couples in civil unions to all of the benefits that married
couples have. See 1999 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 § 1204(a) ("Parties to a civil union shall
have all the same benefit, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive
from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil
law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage."). However, the state may be precluded by
federal law from according certain benefits. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
S Further, there will be no discussion of how ERISA affects issues here. See, e.g.,
Catherine L. Fisk, ERISA Preemption ofState andLocalLaws on Domestic Partnership and
Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Employment, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 267 (1998)
(arguing that ERISA should not be interpreted to preclude legislation requiring employers
to provide domestic partner benefits).
19 Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
20 See, e.g., Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister
States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law
Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr
v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551, 556 (1993-94) (suggesting that full faith and
credit guarantees would not allow states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages validly
established in other states); Habib Balian, Note, 'Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith
and Credit to Marital Status, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 400 (1995) (suggesting that full faith
and credit requirements when properly understood would require such recognition).
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recognize same-sex marriages, Congress passed DOMA,2' one part22 of which dealt
with the conditions under which states would have to recognize marriages validly
established in other states. The Act read in relevant part:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.23
There is some confusion about how this section of the Act should be
interpreted. When it was discussed in Congress, proponents suggested that this
section was necessary to prevent a same-sex couple domiciled in one state from
going to another state where such marriages were recognized, marrying, and then
returning to their home state demanding that the marriage be recognized.24 Yet, if
that was the purpose,25 then this section of the Act was unnecessary, because
domiciles already had the power not to recognize marriages validly established in
other jurisdictions. 6 Indeed, a brief examination of either Restatement (First) or
Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws reveals that domiciles have long had
2 See Heather Hamilton, Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: A Critical Analysis
ofIts Constitutionality under the Full Faith andCredit Clause, 47 DEPAULL. REv. 943,944
(1998) ("In anticipation of the imminent legalization of same-sex marriages in Hawaii,
Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act ....
22 For discussion of the Act's other part, see infra notes 76-113 and accompanying text.
23 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
24 See The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) available at 1996 WL
10829443 ("Thus, it would not be surprising that persons who want to invoke the legitimacy
of 'marriage' for same-sex unions will travel to Hawaii to become 'married.' Then, they will
return to their home states where it would be expected that the state recognize, as valid, a
Hawaii marriage certificate."); The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on S. 1740 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Rep. Largent)
available at 1996 WL 10829445 ("If the state court in Hawaii legalizes same-sex marriage,
homosexual couples from other states around the country will fly to Hawaii to 'marry.'
These same couples will then go back to their respective states and argue that the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires their home state to recognize their union
as a 'marriage."').
5 See 142 CONG. REc. S4870 (daily ed. May 8,1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles) ("This
bill does not change State law, but allows each State to decide for itself with respect to same-
sex marriage .... This effort... reaffirms current practice and policy... ").
6 See The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Prof. Cass Sunstein) available at 1996 WL
10829449 (suggesting that DOMA "gives states no authority that they lack").
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the power to refuse to recognize marriages that are legally void in the domicile even
if validly established elsewhere.27
Some commentators suggest that this DOMA section was merely intended to
reaffirm that the domicile at the time of the marriage has the right to refuse to
recognize a marriage validly established elsewhere and that the courts should not
hold otherwise.28 Yet, the language of the section is much broader than that and, in
fact, does not even include the term "domicile." A literal reading of the section
allows any state to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage, regardless of when or
where it was contracted.
This broad, literal interpretation would permit a significant change in the
interstate recognition practices that had existed up to the time of the Act's passage.
While both Restatements suggest that the domicile at the time a marriage is
established need not recognize a marital union if it violates an important public
policy of the state,29 they both also suggest that a marriage valid in the domicile at
the time of the marriage would be recognized as valid by all of the states."
Two different points may be made about the emphasis in each of the
Restatements on the law of the domicile at the time of the marriage. First, insofar
27 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT]. This provision states:
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either party,
though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been
complied with, will be invalid everywhere in the following cases:
(a) polygamous marriage,
(b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that their marriage
is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil,
(c) marriage between persons of different races where such marriages are at the
domicil regarded as odious,
(d) marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even
though celebrated in another state.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1969) [hereinafter
SECOND RESTATEMENT] ("A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where
the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.").
28 See Leonard G. Brown III, Comment, Constitutionally Defending Marriage: The
Defense of Marriage Act, Romer v. Evans and the Cultural Battle They Represent, 19
CAMPBELL L. REv. 159, 170-71 (1996) (suggesting that DOMA is meant to provide a check
on the federal courts).
29 See supra note 27.
30 See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, §§ 121, 132 (suggesting that a validly
celebrated marriage not void in the domicile is valid). There is one exception regarding
remarriage after divorce that is not relevant for purposes here. See id. at § 131; see also
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 283 (suggesting that a validly celebrated marriage
that does not violate the strong public policy of the state with the most significant contacts
at the time of the marriage is valid).
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as either Restatement is persuasive in a particular jurisdiction,3 a court in that
jurisdiction would tend to follow it and hold that the domicile at the time of the
marriage could refuse to recognize a marriage validly established elsewhere, but a
state that was neither the domicile nor the state where the marriage was established,
should recognize the marriage as long as it was valid in the domicile at the time it
was established. Congress' having passed DOMA and having (allegedly) accorded
each state the power to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage validly established
elsewhere does not speak to whether such a marriage should be recognized. Thus,
absent local legislation to the contrary,32 courts should recognize same-sex
marriages validly established in another domiciliary state because the state has
important interests in protecting the predictability of marriage,33 strengthening and
preserving the integrity of marriage,34 and safeguarding family relationships."
Second, a separate point is that the interpretation of DOMA should itself be
affected by the positions offered in the Restatements, because the Act was,
allegedly, merely intended to affirm existing practices36 and the Restatements offer
influential characterizations of what those existing practices were and are. Thus,
because both Restatements suggest that the law of the domicile at the time of the
marriage will determine the validity of the union, congressional intent in passing
DOMA should be interpreted as permitting domiciles, at the time of the marriage,
to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage validly established elsewhere, but not
permitting a state having no connection to the marriage at the time of its
establishment in a sister domicile to refuse to recognize that union.
Suppose that the DOMA section under examination here is given a broad
interpretation, notwithstanding its proponents' claimed goal to reflect current law.
A separate question is just what that broad interpretation would permit. Perhaps it
would "merely" entitle future domiciles to refuse to recognize same-sex unions. On
the other hand, a broad interpretation might do much more than that, for example,
" See State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545,547 (Ark. 1957) (upholding validity of marriage
void in the domicile after appealing to First Restatement position); Hesington v. Estate of
Hesington, 640 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Mo. App. 1982) (supporting Missouri position with
respect to the validity of marriage by appealing to the Second Restatement position); In re
Estate of Mumion, 686 P.2d 893, 898-99 (Mont. 1984) (upholding marriage after analyzing
and applying Second Restatement position); Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. App.
1985) (suggesting that Texas has adopted the Second Restatement's position with respect
to the validity of marriage).
32 Various states have enacted "mini-DOMAs." See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107
(Michie 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (a), (d) (Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-
3.1 (b) (1996 & Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1(2) (1997 & Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 51-1.2 (Supp. 1997).
" See Vandever v. Indus. Comm'n of Arizona, 714 P.2d 866, 869 (Ariz. App. 1986).
31 See Murnion, 686 P.2d at 899.
31 See id
36 See supra note 25.
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permitting any state to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage, notwithstanding the
current recognition of the union by the couple's domicile.
A very broad interpretation of this section would be of doubtful constitutional
validity, however, as the alleged reason for its passage was quite narrow:
preventing the domicile at the time of the marriage from being forced to recognize
a marriage validly celebrated elsewhere." The Supreme Court struck down
Colorado's Amendment II in Romer v. Evans38 because "its sheer breadth [was] so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seem[ed]
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affect[ed] ... ."" The
Court would have reason to make a similar finding with respect to DOMA,
especially since members of Congress have already suggested that DOMA was
prompted by animus.'
The resolution of how broadly this DOMA section should be read is especially
important in the context discussed here. The Baker holding suggests that Vermont
same-sex couples must be afforded equal benefits;4' it does not suggest that
domiciliaries of other states are entitled to such benefits. Indeed, individuals
seeking to avoid their own state's law by marrying in Vermont might find an
unwelcome surprise. For example, even were it possible for a Vermont same-sex
couple to marry in that state, a same-sex couple domiciled in a state declaring such
marriages void would find that their marriage "celebrated" in Vermont would not
even be recognized by Vermont. 2 Thus, if this section of DOMA merely was
meant to assure that domiciliaries would be unable to go back to their domicile and
demand recognition of their same-sex union validly established elsewhere, the
" Even if the purpose for its passage was thought to be broader, the Act is
constitutionally vulnerable for a number of reasons. Arguably, DOMA is an invalid exercise
of congressional power that violates a number of constitutional guarantees. See generally
Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the
Constitution, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 279 (1997) (arguing that DOMA is unconstitutional
because it is the antithesis of a full faith and credit measure, encroaches on state rights,
unreasonably restricts interstate travel, and unduly burdens a disfavored group).
3 517 U.S. 620 (1996).39 Id. at 632.
40 See The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) available at 1996 WL
10829444 (calling the bill the "Defense of Intolerance Act"); 142 CONG. REC. E1 320-02
(daily ed. July 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Collins) (DOMA "is nothing more than blatant
homophobic gay-bashing.").
41 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) ("Whatever system is chosen...
must conform with the constitutional imperative to afford all Vermonters the common
benefit, protection, and security of the law.") (emphasis added).
42 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 6 (1989) ("A marriage shall not be contracted in this state
by a person residing and intending to continue to reside in another state or jurisdiction, if
such marriage would be void if contracted in such other state or jurisdiction. Every marriage
solemnized in this state in violation of this section shall be null and void.").
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section would be doubly unnecessary in the context under discussion here, because:
(1) states already had that power anyway, and (2) according to Vermont law, such
marriages would not be valid.
Consider a different scenario. Suppose that Vermont were to recognize same-
sex marriages and that a Vermonter were to marry her female partner. Suppose
further that this same-sex couple travelled to another state to honeymoon. If that
second state subscribed to the recognition position articulated in either the First or
Second Restatements, that second state would recognize the marriage, because the
couple's domicile (Vermont) recognizes the union.43 If there was an accident in that
latter state during the honeymoon, then the privileges enjoyed by a spouse (e.g.,
those associated with visiting a patient in the hospital or, perhaps, having a say in
the patient's medical treatment if she were unable to express her own preferences)
would presumably be accorded to the patient's partner."' Further, even if the right
to sue for wrongful death or loss of consortium were limited to family members, the
marital partner might nonetheless be able to bring such a cause of action.45
Suppose the above scenario is modified slightly and the Vermont couple had
instead contracted a civil union. The second state where they were celebrating
Vermont's legal recognition of their relationship would be much less likely to
recognize their civil union status46 and, instead, probably would view the civil union
" A separate issue would be raised if the couple married in Vermont with the intention
of moving to a second state, because that second state might then be viewed as having the
most significant contacts with the couple at the time of the marriage. Here, it is imagined that
the couple plans to live in Vermont.
See Baker, 744 A.2d at 884 (including within the benefits "hospital visitation and
other rights incident to the medical treatment of a family member"). The First Restatement
treats the validity of a marriage and the incidents of marriage in separate sections; therefore,
a state could recognize one without recognizing the other. See Mark Strasser, Judicial Good
Faith and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It's Due, 28 RUTGERs L.J. 313,
363-64 (1997) (discussing difference between validity and incidents of marriage).
4 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724(b) (1999) (wrongful death action can only
be for the benefit of someone related through blood or marriage); GA. CODE ANN. 51-4-2(a),
(b) (1982) (action can only be brought by decedent's spouse or child); IDAHO CODE § 5-311
(1998) (wrongful death action can only be brought by heirs under the statutes of intestate
succession, see IDAHO CODE § 15-1-201(21) (1998), or other family members through
marriage, blood or adoption); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.130 (Michie 1992) (wrongful
death benefits to go to spouse, child, or others related by blood); see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-555a (1991) (loss of consortium action can be brought by spouse); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 302 (Supp. 1999) (married person can bring action for loss of consortium of
spouse); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-a (1997) (loss of consortium claim can be brought
by spouse); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-41 (1997) (married person entitled to recover damages for
loss of consortium caused by tortious injury to spouse); W.V. CODE § 48-3-19a (1999) (a
married woman may sue and recover for loss of consortium to same extent and in all cases
as a married man).
46 See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex
10 - [Vol. 9:1
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benefits accorded by Vermont as purely local and not requiring recognition.47 Were
there an accident, the domestic partner might be treated as a legal stranger to the
patient.
There are at least two different reasons that a state might be unwilling to
recognize another state's civil union benefits. First, the state might have its own
domestic partnership system that accorded less robust benefits than Vermont; for
example, not recognizing the right to sue for wrongful death or loss of consortium.4
The state might well be unwilling to accord a benefit to Vermont civil union
partners that it did not accord to local domestic partners. Second, the state might
consciously have decided not to recognize domestic partnership or civil unions and,
thus, might refuse to recognize Vermont's "novel" system. Therefore, the claim
would not be merely that the states differed with respect to which individuals would
be entitled to become domestic partners49 but, rather, that the states differed with
respect to whether to recognize such an institution at all."
It might be claimed that the analysis above ignores the argument that by passing
DOMA Congress has authorized the states to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages. Yet, this is beside the point for two different reasons. First, DOMA is
vulnerable on a number of constitutional grounds."' If the only reason that states
can refuse to recognize same-sex marriages validly celebrated in other domiciliary
states is that Congress has authorized them to do so, and if this authorization is void
and of no legal effect because Congress did not have such power, then all states
would have to recognize a marriage validly celebrated in another domiciliary state.
Second, even if DOMA is constitutional, it authorized, rather than required, the
non-recognition of same-sex marriages. As long as some states would choose to
recognize the Vermont same-sex marriage if only because of the "strong public
policy ... for upholding the validity of a marriage wherever possible,"52 there
Marriage, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 55 (suggesting that very few jurisdictions recognize
domestic partnerships).
41 See Thomas F. Coleman, The Hawaii Legislature Has Compelling Reasons to Adopt
a Comprehensive Domestic Partnership Act, 5 L. & SEX. 541, 551 (1996) (suggesting that
a virtue of the partnership proposal therein described was that it "would have few
intergovernmental ramifications, since the benefits conferred would remain within the
state").
48 The Baker court explicitly included these rights as among those that must be accorded.
See Baker, 744 A.2d at 883.
41 See supra note 4 (suggesting that some jurisdictions only allow same-sex couples to
register for partnership benefits and others allow both same-and different-sex couples to
register for those benefits).SO Such a state could not say that it had refused to recognize any marriages, even if it did
refuse to permit its domiciliaries to contract a particular marriage, for example, same-sex
unions.
5' See supra note 37.
52 See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 13.8 (2d ed. 1992).
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would be important implications for the Vermont legislation.
One of the reasons that theorists were tempted to think that states might
recognize same-sex marriages established in Hawaii was the growing trend for
states to recognize marriages validly established elsewhere, even if these marriages
could not be validly established in the domicile. The Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act (Uniform Act) "codifies the emerging conflicts principle that marriages
valid by the laws of the state where contracted should be valid everywhere, even if
the parties to the marriage would not have been permitted to marry in the state of
their domicil.,,
33
The emerging conflicts principle is important to consider because it indicates
the unique status of marriage and the very strong tendency of states to recognize
marriages that have been validly established. Indeed, the Uniform Act describes the
principle that the domicile at the time of the marriage should recognize a marriage
validly established elsewhere, notwithstanding 'the established jurisprudence
recognizing that the law of the domicile at the time of the marriage's celebration
determines the marriage's validity. Here, what is being discussed is something far
less "radical" than the recommendation offered in the UniformAct and, further, was
even something recognized in the First Restatement, namely, that states should
recognize the validity of a marriage that is considered valid in a sister domiciliary
state. If the "emerging conflicts principle" suggests that domiciles at the time of the
marriage should recognize marriages validly established elsewhere, it certainly
suggests that marriages valid in the domicile at the time of the marriage should be
recognized throughout the country and a fortiori that a marriage valid in the
domicile at the time of the marriage and in the couple's current domicile should be
recognized by all of the states.
Given the strong presumption regarding the validity of marriages validly
celebrated in sister domiciles54 and the perceived "enormous differences between
marriage and domestic partnership[s]"" likely causing such partnerships to be
viewed as purely domestic creations,56 it would seem extremely likely that some
53 UNIF. MARRIAGE& DIVORCE ACT, § 210 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 76 (1987).
"' See Melissa A. Provost, Comment, Disregarding the Constitution in the Name of
Defending Marriage: The Unconstitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act, 8 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 157, 185-86 (1997) ("marriages carry a very strong presumption of
validity"); Beth A. Allen, Comment, Same-Sex Marriage: A Conflict-of-Laws Analysis for
Oregon, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 619, 647 (1996) (discussing the "strong presumption of
validity" of marriages).
See Slattery v. City of New York, 697 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (App. Div. 1999); see also
Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710 N.E.2d (I1l. App. I Dist. 1999) 91, 98 ("Nothing in the
DPO [domestic partnership ordinance] purports to create a marital status or marriage as
those terms are commonly defined.").




jurisdiction (let us call it State X) would recognize a same-sex marriage but not a
civil union."' That the former would be recognized and some benefits accorded
while the latter would not, suggests that civil unions are an inferior alternative to
marriage that cannot offer equal protections and security.
The point here should not be misunderstood. Assuming that Vermont
recognized same-sex marriages, it would not matter for purposes here that State X:
(a) would not allow its own domiciliaries to marry a same-sex partner, or even (b)
would not recognize a same-sex marriage of current domiciliaries who had validly
contracted the marriage while living in Vermont. As long as State X would
recognize a same-sex marriage of individuals traveling through the state (e.g., who
were still domiciled in Vermont and were vacationing in the state), but would not
recognize the civil union status of such a couple, and as long as affording the former
recognition would, in fact, translate into some benefits and protections, then the
Vermont constitutional requirement that same-sex couples be afforded equal
benefits could not be met by adopting a civil union system instead.58
The claim here is not that Vermont is required by its own constitution to
regulate how other states treat the marriages of Vermonters, but merely that "the
State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common
benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law,"59 and that
setting up a separate civil union system does not meet this mandate. To see why
this is so, it will be helpful to consider first-cousin marriages.
First-cousin marriages are permitted in Vermont,' although numerous states
prohibit such marriages.6' A different state might have a law declaring that first-
" Cf Crawford, 710N.E.2d at99 ("Here DPO [domestic partnership ordinance] affects
only Chicago's personnel policies; no state policy involving any other locality is either
involved or undermined... ."). Just as other localities within the state would not be affected
by one city's passing a domestic partnership ordinance, other states would seem not to be
affected by one state's passing a domestic partnership ordinance; see also Coleman, supra
note 47, at 551 (suggesting that a virtue of the partnership proposal was that other states
would not have to recognize the conferred benefits).
" It might well be that Oregon, for example, would be willing to recognize a same-sex
marriage of visiting Vermonters, compare Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435,
447 (Or. App. 1998) (holding that lesbians and gays are members of a suspect class), even
if that state is unwilling to allow Oregonians to marry a same-sex partner. See id. at 443 n.3
(pointing out that marriage is reserved for different-sex couples, although not addressing the
constitutionality of that restriction).
" Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 887 (Vt. 1999).
60 See 15 VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 1, 2 (1989).
61 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (A),(B) (West 2000) (first-cousin marriages void
unless both are sixty-five or one is unable to reproduce); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-106(a)
(Michie 1998) (marriage between first cousins is "incestuous and absolutely void"); IDAHO
CODE § 32-206 (1996) (first-cousin marriages prohibited); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212
(West 1993) (first-cousin marriage prohibited unless both are fifty or older or one is
permanently and irreversibly sterile); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-8-3 (Michie 1999) (first-
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cousin marriages will not be recognized no matter where or when celebrated, for
example, barring recognition of such marriages even if validly celebrated in
Vermont by Vermont domiciliaries.62 Assuming that the latter state has the power
to enforce such a law,63 there would be nothing that Vermont could do to assure that
a Vermonter's first-cousin marriage would be recognized in the other state. By the
same token, were DOMA amended to permit every state to refuse to recognize the
marriage of first cousins and were that amendment held constitutional, there would
be nothing that Vermont could do to assure that Vermonters who marry their first
cousins would have those marriages recognized in other states.
The fact that Vermont could not assure that other states would recognize the
marriages of Vermont domiciliaries who had married their first cousins would not
justify setting up a separate classification of first-cousin civil unions so that the
relationship would be recognized in even fewer other states." Those who wished
cousin marriages void unless both are sixty-five when marriage solemnized); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 595.19 (West 1996) (first-cousin marriages void); KAN. STAT. ANN § 23-102 (1995)
(first-cousin marriages void); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.0 10 (Michie 1999) (first-cousin
marriages void); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 551.3, 551.4 (West 1988) (individuals cannot
marry their first cousins); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03 (West 1990) (first-cousin marriages
prohibited); MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.020 (West 1997) (first-cousin marriages prohibited);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(i)(b) (2000) (marriage between first cousins prohibited);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-103 (1998) (first-cousin marriages void if of the whole blood); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1, 457:2 (1992) (first-cousin marriages prohibited); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-03-03 (1997) (first-cousin marriages void); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.020 (first-
cousin marriages void unless cousins by adoption only); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-1 (1998)
(first-cousin marriages void unless both are over sixty-five or both are at least fifty-five and
one is unable to reproduce); W.VA. CODE §§ 48-1-2, 48-1-3 (1999) (first cousins shall not
marr unless relationship created solely through adoption); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 765.03 (West
1993) (first cousins may not marry unless female is fifty-five or either is permanently
sterile).
62 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 13 § 10 1(a), (d) (1999); see also ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
25- 101 (A), 25-112(A) (West 2000). It is unclear whether these statutes would be interpreted
to preclude recognition of a first-cousin marriage validly established in another domicile. In
both Mortenson v. Mortenson (In re Estate ofMortenson), 316 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Ariz. 1957)
(first-cousin marriage validly established in New Mexico by Arizona domiciliaries) and
Godt v. Godt, 1990 WL 123047 at *4 (Del. Super. Aug. 7, 1990) (first-cousin marriage
validly established in Maryland by Delaware domiciliaries), first cousins who-had evaded
local law by marrying elsewhere were held not to have valid marriages. If these statutes
would be interpreted not to authorize the refusal to recognize a first-cousin marriage validly
established in another domicile; however, they should also be interpreted not to authorize
the refusal to recognize a same-sex marriage validly established in another domicile, as the
statutes imply that the two kinds of marriages should be treated similarly.
63 But see Mark Strasser, The Privileges of National Citizenship: On Saenz, Same-Sex
Couples, and the Right to Travel, 52 RUTGERs L. REV. 553 (2000) (suggesting that this
would violate the right to travel).
6 The Baker court recognized that some states do not recognize first cousin marriages.
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to marry rather than establish civil unions with their first cousins would rightly
complain if Vermont claimed to be treating them equally but merely gave them the
latter option, even if in fact the benefits within the state were equal in all respects,
because the state would thereby have diminished the partners' protections and
security when they traveled in other states.6"
The issue that interested many commentators who discussed whether other
domiciles would be forced to recognize a same-sex marriage validly established in
Hawaii" is not the issue of interest here. The Vermont Constitution offers
protections to Vermonters, not to Georgians who wish to evade the marriage laws
of that state.67 Precisely because the issue of interest involves Vermonters'benefits,
the benefits and protections accorded current Vermont domiciliaries (for instance,
those who are merely traveling elsewhere) must be examined. The very reason that
protecting Vermonters is important to Vermont is the reason that other states would
be most likely to defer to Vermont and recognize the same-sex marriage of Vermont
domiciliaries, 68 namely, that the ties to Vermont would be substantial and long-
lasting whereas the ties to another state would be slight and temporary. Indeed, in
the nineteenth century when states were thought to have even more power with
respect to whether they would recognize a marriage within the state, 69 a Virginia
court in Ex parte Kinney7° pointed out that the state would have to recognize an
interracial marriage if the couple were merely traveling through the state, even if
See Baker, 744 A.2d at 885 (discussing "Vermont's recognition of unions, such as first-
cousin marriages, not uniformly sanctioned in other states").
65 For example, although Oklahoma expressly refuses to permit first-cousin marriages,
it also expressly provides that "any marriage of first cousins performed in another state
authorizing such marriages, which is otherwise legal, is hereby recognized as valid and
binding in this state as of the date of such marriage." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 2 (1990).
66 See, e.g., Richard S. Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage" and the Public Policy Doctrine,
32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 47 (1998) (focusing on the "most common case" where the
domiciliaries of one state go to Hawaii, marry, and then return to the domicile seeking
recognition of the marriage).
67 See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1999). For reasons to think that it might be especially
unavailing for same-sex couples from Georgia to marry in Vermont even were Vermont to
recognize same-sex marriages, see supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
68 Further, this would seem to be the kind of case in which it would be the most likely
that other states would be constitutionally required to recognize the marriage. See MARK
STRASSER, THE CHALLENGE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FEDERALIST PRINCIPLES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 192 (I 999) (suggesting that due process guarantees would
be implicated in such a case).
69 See Exparte Kinney, 14 F. Cas. 602, 605 (E.D. Va. 1879) ("If Virginia were in the
midocean or on the antipodal continent, her control over the rights and privileges of her
citizens as members of society, including marriage, would be, no more certainly than now,
unrestrained by any provision of the national constitution.").
70 Id.
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Virginia could refuse to allow its own domiciliaries to enter into such a marriage.7
It should not be thought that when the Kinney opinion was written, interracial
marriages were basically accepted, notwithstanding their legal prohibition. On the
contrary, such marriages were considered strongly offensive to local policy. In fact,
in the year preceding the Kinney opinion, the Virginia Supreme Court explained its
view of the importance of prohibiting interracial marriage:
The purity of public morals, the moral and physical development of both
races, and the highest advancement of our cherished southern
civilization,... all require that... [the races] should be kept distinct and
separate, and that connections and alliances so unnatural that God and
nature seem to forbid them, should be prohibited by positive law.72
Earlier in the decade, the Supreme Court of Tennessee had offered its own view
of how offensive such marriages were, suggesting that if interracial marriages were
recognized, polygamous and incestuous marriages would also have to be
recognized."3
Yet, if states were constitutionally required to recognize the interracial
marriages of individuals traveling through the state even though: (1) interracial
marriages were thought at least as offensive to local policy as any other kind of
marriage, and (2) states were viewed as having the same power to establish marital
restrictions for their own domiciliaries as they would have had were they separate
countries,74 then states are currently constitutionally required to recognize the same-
sex marriages of Vermont domiciliaries who are merely traveling outside the state,
since states are now understood to have less sovereignty than they once were
thought to have. 7' Thus, because other states, out of comity or constitutional
obligation, would likely recognize the same-sex marriages of vacationing
Vermonters and (temporarily) afford them increased protections accompanying that
recognition, the Vermont legislature must recognize same-sex marriage if it is to
accord Vermonters equal protection.
7' See id. at 606 ("That such a citizen would have a right of transit with his wife through
Virginia, and of temporary stoppage, and of carrying on any business here not requiring
residence, may be conceded .... ).
72 Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 869 (1878).
.7 See State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. (7 Heisk.) 9, 11 (1872).
74 See supra note 69.
7' For example, the Kinney court claimed that Virginia had the power to preclude any of
its citizens from marrying someone of another race, see Kinney, 14 F. Cas. at 604, although
the United States Supreme Court later made clear that the United States Constitution




C. Marriage for Federal Purposes
The DOMA section discussed above authorizes states to refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages if they so desire.76 A different DOMA section prevents same-
sex couples from being accorded the federal benefits of marriage, notwithstanding
the recognition of their union by the couple's domicile. That DOMA section reads:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.77
This DOMA section should help lay to rest the claim that the Act was passed
to promote federalism,78 although that claim was not plausible even with respect to
the other section of the Act,79 because: (1) DOMA does not permit a state to refuse
to recognize any marriage offensive to an important local policy but instead merely
authorizes the non-recognition of the marriages of an unpopular group, and (2) the
language in the Congressional Record made clear that Congress was interested in
punishing lesbians, gays, and bisexuals rather than in promoting federalism
concerns.80 If these reasons do not negate the claim that Congress, in passing
DOMA, was trying to manifest its willingness to defer to the states about family
matters, then the DOMA section addressing federal benefits should clarify further
that Congress was not trying to support state choice. This section only undermines
the choice of any state deciding to recognize same-sex unions and thus cannot be
thought to embody federalist principles.8
76 For the discussion of that section, see supra notes 23-75 and accompanying text.
77 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
78 See 1996 WL 256695 (written statement of Mr. Wardle before the Judiciary Comm.
on H. 3396, the Defense of Marriage Act) (May 15, 1996) (stating that a main principle
underlying DOMA is a"respect for federalism").
71 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (describing the language of that section).
80 For an analysis of the language and why Congress' attempt to impose legislative
punishment on a particular group implicated bill of attainder guarantees, see generally Mark
Strasser, Essay, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills of Attainder and the Definition of Punishment:
On DOMA, the Hawaii Amendment, and Federal Constitutional Constraints, 48 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 227 (1998).
81 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Extraterritorial Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
When Theory Confronts Praxis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) ("The second effect of
DOMA, by centralizing the federal definition of marriage rather than deferring to state
definitions as the federal government had in the past, cuts against the first theme of state
choice. ... ").
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It might be thought that because this DOMA section "merely" concerns the
federal benefits that married couples enjoy, Congress can do as it chooses82 and,
probably, has often exercised its prerogative to decide which married couples will
be entitled to receive those benefits. Both assumptions would be mistaken. Indeed,
Congress has always deferred to a state's definition of marriage,83 even when many,
but not all, states refused to allow interracial couples to marry.84
Congress' previous practice of deferring to the state definition of marriage was
likely due to the fact that family law is a "peculiarly state province." 5 As Justice
Rehnquist explained, family law is a matter "of peculiarly local concern and
therefore governed by state and not federal law."8 6 Indeed, in United States v.
Lopez,87 the Court struck down Congress' power to criminalize the possession of
a firearm within a school zone, at least in part, because the federal government's
rationale would imply that "Congress could regulate any activity that it found was
related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example."88
The claim here is not that Congress is always prohibited from passing
regulations affecting family law. For example, Congress has passed the Parental
Kidnapping and Prevention Act89 and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support
Orders Act,' and those have not been held by the Court to violate constitutional
guarantees. Nonetheless, Congress bears a heavy burden if it is to justify the
displacement of state law. As the Court explained in Rose v. Rose,9" "[b]efore a
state law governing domestic relations will be overridden, it 'must do "major
82 See Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REv. 1,4 (1997) ("The definitional provision of DOMA may
be unwise, inhumane, and insulting, but its constitutionality seems, on first blush, to be
secure from doubt. Congress obviously has the power to define the terms of the U.S.
Code."). Yet, there is nothing obvious about this, even when one sets aside equal protection
issues. See infra notes 83-112 and accompanying text.
83 See Jon-Peter Kelly, Note, Act of Infidelity: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is
Unfaithful to the Constitution, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 203, 204 (1997) (suggesting
that this was unprecedented).
84 For example, such marriages were permissible in Rhode Island but not in
Massachusetts in the early 1800s. In Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 159 (1819), the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had to decide whether to recognize an interracial
marriage validly celebrated in Rhode Island. The court decided that the marriage should be
recognized.
85 See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 353 (1966).
86 McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 237 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
88 Id. at 564.
89 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
90 See id. at § 1738B.
91 481 U.S. 619 (1987).
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damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests."'92
Perhaps it would seem that Congress is not displacing state law in this DOMA
provision because it is only defining marriage forfederal purposes. Yet, this would
misrepresent the relevant jurisprudence. The Court explained in DeSylva v.
Ballentine93 that the "scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but
that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by state, rather than
federal law."'94 Indeed, it is especially appropriate to apply state law "where a
statute deals with a familial relationship ... ",. After all, "there is no federal law
of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern."'96
Congress might be able to justify displacing state law if, for example, national
defense were at issue.97 The Court has made clear, however, that "generalities as
to the paramountcy of the federal interest do not lead inevitably to the result the
Government seeks."9 8 In United States v. Yazell, 99 the Court suggested that
solicitude for state interests.., in the field of family and family-property
arrangements.., should be overridden by the federal courts only where
clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot
be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer
major damage if the state law is applied."°
While saving money was viewed as a legitimate interest, °'0 that interest was held
not to be sufficiently important to uphold the federal government's claims. 2
When this DOMA section is finally challenged, the Court will have to decide
whether the provision is preventing major damage to clear and substantial federal
interests. While it is unclear what the Court will decide,0 3 it is, at the very least,
9 Id. at 625 (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (citation
omitted)).
9' 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
94 Id. at 580.
95 Id.
96 Id.
"' See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981) (upholding insured service member's
right to designate freely the beneficiary of the insurance); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655
(1950) (upholding right to servicemen to make insurance benefit payable to relative of
choice because this might affect morale).
98 United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 349 (1966).
9" Id. at 352.
1o0 Id.
o1 See id. at 348 ("Undeniably there is always a federal interest to collect moneys which
the Government lends.").
02 See id. at 343 (affirming the decision below and stating "[tihe Government was
rebuffed by the trial and appellate courts").
"03 Cf James A. Riddle, Comment, Preemption of Reconcilable State Regulation:
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surprising to suggest that the "only way to challenge this provision (i.e., the DOMA
provision defining marriage for federal purposes) is to claim that it is impermissibly
discriminatory,"'' when the claim involving no major damage to clear and
substantial federal interests has been successful in the past in limiting federal
displacement of state family law,"°5 and when the current Court has become
increasingly willing to limit Congress' power over the states.0 6
Those arguing for the constitutionality of this DOMA section will have some
difficulty establishing what clear and substantial federal interests it serves. The
section's proponents might claim that the federal government has a legitimate
interest in saving money and that same-sex marriages would involve the extension
of benefits that would not otherwise have to be extended. 7 However, the Yazell
Court's clarification that the mere saving of money, while legitimate,'08 is not a
sufficiently important interest tojustify displacement of state law suggests that such
a tack would not be successful.0 9
If the Court held that saving money met the relevant standard, then Congress
would seem permitted to deny recognition to any sort of marriage that it chose (e.g.,
Republican, Democratic, interfaith, etc.) in the interest of protecting the Federal
Treasury. Further, Congress would be entitled to pass a variety of measures
regulating the family as long as federal funds might thereby be saved.
It seems clear that in passing DOMA, Congress was not motivated by a desire
to promote federalism (or the first part would have been more general and the
second part not passed at all) but, instead, sought to impose a burden on a
disfavored group. On numerous occasions, members of Congress have made clear
Federal Benefit Schemes v. State Marital Property Law, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 685, 698-99
(1983) (suggesting that the interest implicated in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572
(1979), was not substantial, the Court's analysis to the contrary notwithstanding).
"04 See Koppelman, supra note 82, at 4-5.
115 Indeed, it had already been successful when it was described by Professor Koppelman
as "toothless," see id. at 5 n.25, because Yazell was decided in 1966 and it basically
incorporated the relevant language. See supra text accompanying note 100 (citing the
relevant language of the opinion).
o1 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (referring to United States v. Lopez).
07 See Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection After Romer v. Evans: Implications for
the Defense of Marriage Act and Other Laws, 49 HASTINGs L.J. 175, 212 (1997) ("Section
3 of the DOMA would indeed protect the federal treasury from any claim to federal benefits
by same-sex couples."). A separate question is how much would be saved. See id.
("Although no estimates have been made of the cost of federally recognizing same-sex
marriages, there are reasons to believe that the total cost would be small.").
08 It is precisely because the interest might be legitimate but not substantial that it is
wrong to dismiss this analysis by pointing out that if "the law's purpose is illegitimate, the
law is already invalid." See Koppelman, supra note 82, at 5 n.25.
"09 See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (suggesting that saving money does
not meet the requisite standard).
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that they do not wish to "condone" or "promote" the Say "lifestyle.'' l Yet, if
Congress passed DOMA to express its disapproval of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals,
this purpose itself may have constitutional significance. The Court has cautioned
that legislators are not permitted to pass legislation that "classifies homosexuals not
to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else."''.
As the Court made clear in United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno,"2
"if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything,
it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.""'
The federal benefits provision of DOMA is at the very least constitutionally
vulnerable. Were it in fact found unconstitutional, there would be yet another
reason that Vermont's domestic partnership system would not pass state
constitutional muster. Because same-sex civil union partners still would not be
entitled to federal marital benefits,"' but different-sex marital partners would, "' the
Vermont civil union system would not be according Vermonters "the common
benefit, protection, and security of the law""' 6 in yet another respect, for the
Vermont civil union partners would have been denied the federal benefits that
would "flow from marriage under Vermont law.'
') 17
Regardless of whether DOMA is constitutional, the civil union option will not
"to See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. E373-74 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Chenowith) (suggesting that same-sex relations involve a "perversion"); 142 CONG. REC.
E752 (daily ed. May 9, 1998) (statement of Rep. Doman) (reading into record an article
discussing the "reckless lifestyle inherent in the gay experience"); 142 CONG. REC. S 10131-
32 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coats) (expressing concern about promoting
gay lifestyle); 140 CONG. REc. 25,143-46 (1994) (supporting bill that would preclude funds
from being used which would have the purpose or effect of depicting homosexuality as
normal); 135 CONG. 13,3332 (1989) (statement of Sen. Helms) (suggesting that same-sex
relations involve a perversion).
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
112 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
113 Id. at 534.
114 See Foreman, supra note 4, at 342 (discussing government's denial of marital benefits
to domestic partners).
"l See 142 CONG. REC. H7495 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lipinski).
This Federal definition would ensure that a State could not define a 'marriage'
that the Federal Government would have to recognize. If the Federal
Government does not act now, and Hawaii legalizes homosexual marriage, the
Federal Government would then be obliged to provide the same benefits that
heterosexual marriages currently receive. Unless this bill is passed establishing
a Federal definition of marriage, all Americans will then be paying for benefits
for homosexual marriages.
Id
116 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
117 Id.
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be according same-sex couples equal benefits. Thus, it would be unnecessary to
wait for DOMA to be declared unconstitutional to establish this inequality, although
a declaration of the Act's unconstitutionality would make the inequality between
marital and civil union status even clearer.
II. THE IMPOSITION OF STIGMA
Suppose that the issue of equal benefits was somehow resolved so that
marriages and civil unions were held to accord the same benefits. One issue would
be whether some of the relevant benefits had not been included within the
comparison. A separate issue would be whether setting up a separate civil union
system that accords equal benefits nonetheless imposes a stigma and, for that
reason, is unconstitutional. It is difficult to see how the Vermont Supreme Court
could examine the civil union legislation and fail to find both that some benefits had
not been included in the comparison and, that in any event, the separate system was
stigmatizing and hence unconstitutional.
A. When Are Equal Benefits Being Accorded?
The Vermont Supreme Court made clear that the possible parallel system to be
set up by the Vermont legislature would have to accord same-sex couples equal
benefits."' The court gave examples of the rights that must be included," 9 but also
made clear that it had offered a non-exhaustive list. 2 1 The court did not make clear,
however, which kinds of benefits had to be offered.
The issue of concern here can be made clearer when one considers the attempts
that have been made to create separate but equal institutions in other contexts. For
example, in Sweatt v. Painter,2' the Court struck down Texas' attempt to set up a
segregated law school to avoid integrating the University of Texas. The Court
noted some of the differences between the schools' students, faculty, and library.22
The Court also noted a difference in "those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school."'2 By the
same token, the Court in United States v. Virginia 24 suggested that intangible
differences are sometimes even more important than the tangible ones. 12' Thus, the
Court has made clear that intangible qualities or qualities incapable of measurement
118 See id.
, See id. at 883-84.
120 See id. at 884 (finding that "other statutes could be added to this list").
121 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
.22 See id: at 632-33.
23 Id. at 634.
124 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
125 See id. at 554.
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can have constitutional significance when a determination must be made regarding
whether equal protection requirements have been met or whether equal benefits
have been accorded.
When the Court rejected Virginia's proposal to set up a separate program for
women at Mary Baldwin College so that the Virginia Military Institute would not
have to accept women applicants, the Court pointed out that the Mary Baldwin
program "does not qualify as VMI's equal," because, among other things, the two
were not equal in prestige.'26 One question for the Vermont Supreme Court will be
whether the prestige of the option is itself a constitutionally significant
consideration, for it is difficult to understand how the civil union alternative
plausibly could be considered equal to marriage in prestige.
The claim, of course, is not that no one would choose civil union status over
marriage. Even those who have the option of marrying sometimes choose to
register as domestic partners instead." 7 The point here is merely that the benefits
accorded are not equal if the prestige or other intangible or difficult-to-measure
qualities are unequal, even if particular individuals might nonetheless choose for
their own reasons the option that accorded fewer benefits.
B. On According Equal Benefits to Inferiors
The Baker court understood that the "symbolic or spiritual significance of the
marital relation" '' n would not be included within the benefits accorded by domestic
partnership status but suggested that "it is plaintiffs' claim to the secular benefits
and protections of a singularly human relationship that ...characterizes this
case."' 29 As suggested above,'30 however, because qualities are intangible or
difficult to measure does not make them of merely symbolic or spiritual
significance. The benefits afforded. by the more prestigious alternative, for
example, can be quite real.
The above point notwithstanding, the importance of the symbolic should not be
minimized. Indeed, the Vermont court seemed to appreciate the importance of
symbolism when it explained that "the essential aspect of [plaintiffs'] claim is
simply and fundamentally for inclusion in the family of state-sanctioned human
relations.""' The court seemed not to notice that equality guarantees require not
126 Id. at 55 1.
127 See James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic Partnerships to
Same-Sex Couples, 8 L. & SEX. 649, 656-57 (1998) (stating that most domestic partnership
plans "extend their benefits to unmarried heterosexuals... [and] these plans typically result
in unwed straight couples being the majority of beneficiaries").
.28 Biker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 888-89 (Vt. 1999).
129 Id. at 889.
30 See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
' Baker, 744 A.2d at 889.
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only that same-sex relationships be included within the "family" of human relations,
but also that they not be included within the family merely as a poor relation. While
it may be preferable to be considered a poor relation rather than a complete stranger,
it should never be thought that according better treatment necessarily meets the
requirement to accord equal treatment. Commentators are correct when they
complain that lesbians and gays seek more than tolerance,' 32 but are incorrect when
falsely implying that seeking equality somehow involves seeking preferential
treatment.1
33
In Plessy v. Ferguson, '31 the Court rejected the claim that "the enforced
separation of the two races [in railway cars] stamps the colored race with a badge
of inferiority,"' 3 instead claiming that were a badge of inferiority thereby imposed,
it would not be "by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."' 136 Ultimately, the Court
repudiated the claim that the stamp of inferiority imposed by requiring racial
separation in railway cars had been "chosen."' 37 It should be noted that both
proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage recognize the symbolic importance
of whether such unions are legally recognized, 138 and neither denies that the failure
to recognize such marriages has implications for equality.'39
A brief examination of the Congressional Record, for example, reveals what
132 See Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf: Supreme Court Storytelling,
the Culture War and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 345, 358 (1997) (pointing
out that "when homosexual activists seek validity for same-sex marriages they are
demanding much more than tolerance").
133 See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 46, at 59 ("[T]he gay-lesbian demand that homosexual
couples be allowed to marry is a demand for special preferred status, not merely for
tolerance.").
134 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
"' Id. at 551.
136 Id.
137 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
138 See Chambers, supra note 6, at 450 ("Whatever the context of the debate, most
speakers are transfixed by the symbolism of legal recognition [of same-sex marriage].").
139 See, e.g., id. at 450-51:
In a law-drenched country such as ours, permission for same-sex couples to
marry under the law would signify the acceptance of lesbians and gay men as
equal citizens more profoundly than any other nondiscrimination laws that might
be adopted. Most proponents of same-sex marriage, within and outside gay and
lesbian communities, want marriage first and foremost for this recognition. Most
conservative opponents oppose it for the same reason.
See also Michael Mandell, Same Sex Marriages: Arizona Reacts to a Perceived Threat to
Traditional Marriages, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 623, 632 (1997) ("[O]pponents of same-sex
marriages argue that a state's recognition of homosexual marriages would convey 'an
unmistakable imprimatur of acceptability and legitimacy upon the practice of homosexuality'
that would serve to undermine traditional heterosexual marriages.") (citation omitted).
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members of Congress believe is at stake if same-sex marriages are recognized.
Some members apparently believe that the survival of the country hangs in the
balance, 40 which sounds strikingly familiar to the claims made by the Virginia
Supreme Court with respect to what would happen were interracial marriages
recognized. 4' Others suggest that legal recognition of same-sex unions would
somehow trivialize and demean marriage,'42 notwithstanding that same-sex couples
who contracted marriages would have the same rights and responsibilities that
different-sex couples have,'43 and notwithstanding the claim of these same
opponents that such marriages, even if recognized, would not be "real" anyway.'"
What is manifestly clear is that opponents of same-sex marriage want to assure that
same-sex relationships are not viewed as "equal" to different-sex marriages. 45
These commentators seem to have forgotten that part of the rationale in Loving v.
Virginia'4 6 for striking down Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute was that Virginia
had been attempting, via its marriage statute, to promote the view that one group
was superior to another.'47
In his Plessy dissent, Justice Harlan asked rhetorically,
[w]hat can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create
and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state
enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens
are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
140 See 142 CONG. REC. H8820-21 (daily ed. July 30, 1996) (statement of Rep. Doman)
(referring to an address by Billy Graham); see also 142 CONG. REC. H7275 (daily ed. July
11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) (suggesting that the survival of Western civilization was
at stake).
141 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
142 See 142 CoNG. REC. H7487 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith)
("Same-sex 'marriages' demean the fundamental institution of marriage. They legitimize
unnatural and immoral behavior. And they trivialize marriage as a mere 'lifestyle choice."').
"' This was one of the elements that the Baker court recognized as constitutionally
required. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
'44 See 142 CONG. REC. H7487 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Funderburk)
("If homosexuals achieve the power to pretend that their unions are marriages .... ")
(emphasis added); see also 142 CONG. REC. H7270, H7275 (daily ed. July 11, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Largent) ("Destroying the exclusive territory of marriage to achieve a
political end will not provide homosexuals with the real benefits of marriage, but it may
eventually be the final blow to the American family.") (emphasis added).
'41 See 142 CONG. REC. H7491 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Canady)
("[T]he basic question ... [is]. whether the law of this country should treat homosexual
relationships as morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships."); see also 140 CONG. REC.
6824 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (reading letter into the record suggesting the importance
of not equating same-sex and different-sex relationships).
146 388 U.S. I (1967).
141 See id at 7.
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coaches occupied by white citizens? 4"
An analogous question might be asked with respect to the refusal to permit same-
sex marriages, since the state is implying that lesbian and gay citizens "are so
inferior and degraded" that they cannot be allowed to marry their life-partners.
Same-sex marriage opponents seem to have the implicit, if not explicit,
attitude 49 that lesbians, gays, and bisexuals are, at best, second-class citizens who
are not equal to everyone else.'50 Yet, the Court in United States v. Virginia struck
down the VMI policy, at least in part, because the state's policy denied women "full
citizenship stature.""' In Heckler v. Mathews,"2 the Court explained that
discrimination itself, by perpetuating "archaic and stereotypic notions"
or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as "innately
inferior" and therefore as less worthy participants in the political
community, can cause serious noneconomic injuries to those persons
who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their
membership in a disfavored group."'
Denying same-sex couples the right to marry will continue to cause them both
economic and non-economic injuries, and the issue in Vermont and elsewhere will
be whether it is constitutionally permissible to continue to cause these harms.
In Strauder v. West Virginia,'54 the Court made clear how important it was to
be "exempt[] from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society...
"155 Yet, the states' singling out lesbians and gays and denying them the right to
marry "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, [that is] an assertion of
their inferiority .... 56 It is precisely this kind of stigmatization that is an affront
to our constitutional system. The Court in Romer v. Evans suggested that laws are
148 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
149 See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S414 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Helms)
(discussing turning back "the tide of the homosexual community in its efforts to force
Americans to accept, and even legitimize, moral perversion").
SO See Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriage and Moral
Discernment, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 239, 239 (1998) (discussing the "radical and dangerous
agenda" of those who allege the "equal goodness of homosexuality and heterosexuality."); cf
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,635 (1996) ("We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else.").
151 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
5 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
Id. at 739-40 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)).
154 100 U.S. 303 (1879).




unconstitutional if they "raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected."' 57 It is difficult
to see how laws preventing same-sex marriage that are supported by claims to
"protect" marriage and to prevent it from being "demeaned" and "trivialized" can
fail to raise an inference of impermissible hostility.
CONCLUSION
In Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the state constitution
requires that same-sex couples be afforded the opportunity to receive the same
benefits, protections, and security that married couples receive. Yet, the Vermont
legislature has not fulfilled that constitutional mandate by setting up a parallel civil
union system, at least in part, because of the differing treatment that same-sex
marriages and civil union would receive in other states. Because marriage has a
unique status and accords benefits that simply could not be duplicated by a
"parallel" civil union, the latter simply cannot be viewed as affording all of the
benefits that flow from the recognition of the former.
Even if marital and civil union status should offer the same benefits, it is
difficult to understand why a state would go to the trouble of setting up a parallel
system if the state did not somehow feel that marriage would be "tainted" by
allowing same-sex couples to enjoy that status. Yet, sincere worries about taint
notwithstanding, states would be prohibited from setting up a parallel system for
interracial or interfaith marriages that afforded equal benefits, because doing so
would be stigmatizing. The taint justification is no more persuasive in the context
of same-sex marriage than it would be in the context of interfaith or interracial
marriages.
Even if Vermont could accord equal benefits by recognizing civil union status,
the state is nonetheless constitutionally prohibited from setting up a parallel system
precisely because of the stigma that will be associated with that status. As Justice
Johnson noted in her concurring and dissenting opinion in Baker, "singling out a
particular group for special treatment may have a stigmatizing effect more
significant than any economic consequences."'58
Certainly, the civil union status discussed here is better for lesbians and gays
than what any other state has thus far offered. Yet, equality guarantees require
more than a lessening of inequality so that lesbians and gays will be treated as poor
relations rather than as complete strangers; those guarantees require the according
of full citizenship and equal stature. That is something that a "separate but equal"
status simply cannot achieve.
'" Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 1996).
5 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 899 n.2 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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